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This paper develops a quantitative theoretical model for the optimal provision of public capital. 
We show that the ratio of public to private capital in the U.S. economy from 1925 to 1992 evolves 
in a manner that is generally consistent with an optimal transition path derived from the model. 
The model is also used to quantify the conditions under which an increase in the stock of public 
capital is desirable and to investigate the effects of hypothetical nonoptimal fiscal policies on 
productivity growth. 
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In recent years, the link between public capital and private sector production  has 
been a subject of  considerable debate among policymakers  and researchers.  Although 
the idea that public capital may represent  an important productive input is not new 
(for example, see Arrow and Kurz [1970]), work by Aschauer (1989, 1993) and Munnell 
(1990) stimulated renewed interest in this area because their empirical results suggested 
that large gains could be had by expanding public investment.  These researchers also 
claimed  that the observed decline in  the rate of  public  capital accumulation  during 
the 1970s and 1980s contributed significantly  to the slowdown  in the growth rate of 
U.S.  labor productivity over the same period.  Subsequent studies have added to the 
debate by attempting to confirin  (or refute)  the productive  effects  of  public  capital 
using increasingly sophisticated empirical methods.'  Up  to this point, however, little 
attention has been given to addressing these issues from a theoretical perspective. 
In this paper, we develop a quantitative theoretical model for the optimal provision of 
public capital. We show t11a.t the ratio of  public to private capital in the U.S. economy 
from  1925 to 1992 evolves in a  manner that is generally  consistent with an optimal 
transition path derived from a simple endogenous growth framework. Moreover, we are 
able to  quantify the conditions under which an increase in the stock of public capital is 
justified  in terms of maximizing the utility of a representative household.  We find that 
even when the output elasticity of public capital is as high as 0.10, an increase in public 
capital from current levels is not called for.  Finally, we  show that a nonoptimal public 
investment policy of  the type that might  be interpreted as reflecting  U.S.  experience 
'For  instance, Aaron  (1990),  Tatom  (1991),  and  Holtz-Eakin  (1992)  have sl~own  that empirical 
methods which incorporate omitted variables, adjustments for nonstationarities, or more disaggregated 
data find that the output elasticity of public capital is not statistically different from zero.  In contrast, 
Lynde and Richmond  (1992), Finn (1993), and Ai and Cassou  (1995) show that empirical techniques 
which properly handle reverse causality concerns continue to support large contributions to output from 
public capital. 
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that began in the early 1970s.  In  contrast, we  show that the trend of increasing tax 
rates in the U.S. economy offers a better explanation for the productivity slowdown in 
the context of  our model. 
To perform our analysis, we  embed a version of  the empirical public capital model 
used  by  Aschauer  (1989),  Munnell  (1990),  and  others in  an equilibrium framework 
with an optimizing government.2  The optimizing framework is similar to one used  by 
Glomm  and Ravikumar  (1994).  Our model  differs from  theirs in three fundamental 
ways.  First, both private and public capital stocks are long-lived. Second, labor supply 
is endogenous, and third, the relevant stock of  public capital for production is the per 
capita (or per firm) quantity.  Our motivation for each of  these features is as follows: 
By  modeling capital as long-lasting, we  are able to capture the lengthy  transitional 
dynamics of  an economy moving toward its balanced  growth path.  With endogenous 
labor supply, the model can be used to investigate changes in the growth rate of labor 
productivity arising from changes in the capital stocks.  Finally, by specifying public 
capital as a per capita quantity, we  link our model to previous empirical specifications in 
the literature which typically do not include any explicit congestion  effect^.^  The model 
is used to explore the optimal transitional dynamics for an economy moving toward a 
balanced growth path and to quantify the effects of some hypothetical nonoptimal fiscal 
policies on productivity gr~wth.~ 
'Early  work  by  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977),  Barro  (1979),  and Lucas  and  Stokey  (1983)  laid 
the groundwork for evaluating government optimization problems.  Most of  the recent work has been 
on  applications to the Ramsey optimal-tax problem  (e.g.,  Lucas  [1990],  Zhu  [1992],  Jones, Manuelli 
and Rossi [1993], Chari, Christian0 and Icehoe [1994], and Cassou [1995]).  Recently, Barro (1990) and 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) have investigated the spending side of the government budget constraint. 
3Specifying public capital as a per capita quantity incorporates an implicit congestion effect  asso- 
ciated with the size of  the population.  This differs from the explicit  congestion effect in Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1994), where congestion is linked to the size of  the private capital stock. 
4Some recent research that also investigates transitional dynamics in neoclassical  models includes 
King and Rebelo (1993) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
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Section 3 describes the transitional dynamics of optimal fiscal policy.  Section 4 describes 
how  we  obtain parameter values  to carry out our quantitative exercises.  Section  5 
presents the quantitative exercises, and section 6 concludes. 
2. The Model 
The model economy consists of  a private sector that operates in competitive markets 
and a benevolent government that solves a dynamic version of  the Ramsey (1927) op- 
timal tax problem. The private sector is typical of  macroeconomic models with agents 
behaving optimally, taking government  policy as given.  In formulating its policy, the 
government takes into account the rational responses of the private sector. Our descrip- 
tion of the economy proceeds in two steps and reflects this Stackelberg game hierarchy. 
2.1. The Private Sector 
The private sector consists of alarge but fixed number of households.  Each household 
is the owner of a single firm that produces output yt  at time t according to the technology 
where  0 < Ao, 0 < 8; for  i = 1,2,3, and 81 f 82 f B3  = 1.5  With this technology, 
there are three factors of  production: the per capita stock of  private capital kt, the per 
capita labor supply lt, and the per capita stock of public capital  The firm chooses 
kt and lt, but takes kg,t as exogenously supplied by the government.  Defining kg,t as a 
per capita quantity ensures that there are no scale effects associated with the number of 
firms.  Output is also affected by  ht, which is an index of  knowledge outside the firm's 
5Empirical research by  Aschauer  (1989),  Munnell  (1990),  Ai and  Cassou  (1995),  and others finds 
support for a technology specification with 81 +  82  +  83 = 1. 
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assumed that knowledge grows proportionally to, and as a by-product of, accumulated 
- 
private investment and research activities, such that ht  =  kt, where Kt is the average 
capital stock across firms. With this specification, the assumption that firms view ht as 
outside their control requires that there be a sufficiently large number of firms so that 
no single firm has an impact on Et.  Furthermore, because all firms are identical, zt  = kt 
in equilibrium.  Thus, the condition 
is imposed after firms choose their optimal labor and capital input  level^.^ 
It is assumed that firms operate in competitive markets and maximize profits 
where wt  denotes the real wage and rt  denotes the real rental rate on private capital. 
Since dl +  d2 +  d3 = 1,  the firm earns an economic profit equal to public capital's share of 
output. Our assumptions about firm ownership iinply that all housel~olds  receive equal 
amounts of totd profits.7 We assume that these profits are distributed to households as 
dividends and taxed as ordinary income. The market clearing prices for private capital 
- 
'The  technology specification, the equilibrium condition ht = kt = kt, and the condition 91 +&+& = 
1, imply constant returns to scale in the two reproducible factors kt and  Consequently, the model 
exhibits endogenous growth. I<ocherlakota and Yi (1995) find evidence in U.S. data supporting growth 
models that emphasize public capital.  See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)  for  a  review  of  modeling 
structures that exhibit endogenous growth. 
'It  is possible to allow for different numbers of households and firms.  However, as long as ownership 
of  firms is uniform across households, each household  will  realize exactly the same level of  profits as 
here. 
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Tt  =  @2yt  B'y",  wt=- 
kt  It 
and 
The infinitely-lived representative household chooses {ct,  lt,  it,  kt+l :  t > 0)  to max- 
imize 
subject to 
kt+l  =  ~~ki-~i,6,  ko  given, 
where 0 < ,B  < 1, 0 5 B, 1 < y, 0 < A1, and 0 < S 5 1. In this specification, ct denotes 
private consumption at time t, it is private investment, and rt is the income tax rate. 
The household  operates in competitive markets and takes government  tax policy  rt, 
knowledge accumulation ht, and dividends rt  as being determined outside of its control. 
Three features of  the household's  problem  warrant  comment.  First, the average 
capital stock affects the marginal utility of leisure via the knowledge accumulation term. 
This specification, which can be motivated by household production theory, ensures that 
the supply of labor, It, remains stationary along the balanced growth path.'  Second, the 
parameter y controls the elasticity of household lambor  supply. As y becomes very large, 
the level of labor supplied approaches one, and the model reduces to one with a fixed 
labor supply. Third, the  law of motion for private capital given by (4) implies a nonlinear 
relationship between current investment  and next  period's  capital.  When S = 1 and 
'See Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1994). 
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When 0 < S < 1, capital is long lasting.  This nonlinear specification has been used by 
Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) and can be viewed  as reflecting adjustment costs as in 
Lucas and Prescott (1971). 
Using standard techniques, it can be shown that the household's decision rules are 
given by 
ct  =  (1 -  ao)(l -  rt)yt,  (5) 
2.2.  The Public Sector 
The government chooses an optimal program of taxes and expenditures to  maximize 
the discounted utility of  the household.  In addition to public investment, government 
expenditures include purchases of other goods and services, gt, which do not contribute 
to  production or household utility.  We model nonproductive expenditures as a constant 
fraction 4 > 0 of  total output, such that gt  = 4yt, but assume that the policymaker 
views gt as exogenous.  This specification is a simple way of ensuring that gt continues 
to represent a significant fraction of output in this growing economy.10 
To finance expenditures, the government imposes a tax on income at the rate rt such 
that 
ig,t  + gt  =  TtYt  (8) 
'~n  appendix showing the derivation of these decision rules and other analytical results in the paper 
can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
''Alternatively,  we could introduce gt  as an additively separable  argument in the household  utility 
function  (3). In this case, we  obtain the same result-that  the ratio  is constant in equilibrium. 
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Public investment contributes to future public capital stocks according to the following 
law of  motion, which is analogous to (4): 
1-6.6 
kg,t+i  = Aik,,,  z,,,,  kg,o  given. 
The government's problem can be formalized as choosing {rt,  ig,t,  kg,t+1,  ct, It, it,  kt+l : 
t  2 0), so as to maximize (3) subject to (4), (5),  (G), (7),  (8), and (9).  Because  the 
model is analytically tractable, standard optimization procedures yield  the following 
optimal policy rules: 
Zg,t  =  alyt,  (10) 
where a1  =  &.  Notice that the tax rate is constant over time and that it can 
be decomposed into two parts, one for public iilvestmeilt igYt  and one for nonproductive 
expenditures gt. 
3. Transitional Dynamics of Optimal Fiscal Policy 
The model's  tractable nature allows us to obtain closed-form expressions describing 
the optimal transition path for an economy with initial conditions that lie off the bal- 
anced growth path. To characterize the trailsitional dynamics, we begin by computing 
the optimal ratio of  public  to private capital, R*, when  the economy is in balanced 
growth.  The intuition for the transitional  changes is straightforward.  If  the current 
value of  Rt = %  is less than the balanced growth ratio R*, then optimal policy would 
call for an increase in Rt over time until R* is reached.  On  the other hand, if  Rt is 
greater than R*, then a decline in Rt over time would be consistent with optimal fiscal 
policy. 
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the household and government decisioil rules with the laws of motion for the two capital 
stocks (4) and (9). Because there are two state variables, kt and kg,t, the decision rules 
must be solved jointly to obtain the equations that govern the optimal transition path 
leading to R* . 
Substituting the optimal decision rules (6), (7), and (ll), and the production equa- 
tions (1) and (2), into (4) yields 
Equation (12) is the equilibrium law of inotioil governing the evolution of private capital 
when  there is optimal behavior on the part of  households, firms, and the government. 
Similarly, (lo), (ll),  (7), (I),  and (2) call be substituted into (9) to  yield the equilibrium 
law of motion for public capital: 
Dividing (13) by (12) gives 
This equation implies that along the balanced growth path, that is, when  = 9, 
"*  = .,(1_ab1-4)  9  which is constant. Making use of the expressions for ao, al, and (11) 
where T is the constant tax rate.  By combining (12) and R*, the  yields R* = 
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4. Calibration of the Model 
In general, parameters are assigned values based on empirically observed features of 
the U.S. economy. However, for some parameters, such as the output elasticity of public 
capital 83,  there is no general consensus regarding the appropriate value.  Since 83  is 
important for determining  R*, we  a.ttempt to remain objective by  exploring a range 
of  values.12  We  also explore  a range of  values for  the parameter 6, which  appears in 
the laws of  motion for the two 'capital stocks.  In this case, the range is motivated by 
the lack of empirical attention given to the nonlinear specification for the relationship 
between current investment and next period's  capital stock. 
We  choose baseline  parameter values as follows:  A discount factor of  /3  = 0.962 
implies that the real return on private assets along the balanced  growth path is equal 
to 4 percent.  Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988), we  set y = 1.60, 
which implies that the intertemporal elasticity of  substitution in labor supply l/(y -  1) 
is equal to 1.7.  Although  the share of  output used  to compensate workers has been 
relatively constant over time, estimates of  O2  are influenced by the way in which certain 
types of  income are apportioned between labor and capital.  For example, proprietor's 
income, indirect business taxes, and imputed services from consumer durables may affect 
"To  derive this result,  we  make use of  the expression  O1  +  O2 + 03  = 1.  Consequently,  this is a 
necessary condition for balanced growth in the model. 
 he  range of direct empirical estimates for o3 at the aggregate national level is quite large. Aschauer 
(1989) and Munnell (1990) estimate values of 0.39 and 0.34, respectively.  Finn (1993) estimates a value 
of  0.16 for highway public capital.  Aaron (1990) and Tatom (1991) argue that removing the effects of 
trends and taking account of possible missing explanatory variables, such as oil-price shocks, can yield 
point estimates for 03  that are not statistically different from zero. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9509.pdfestimated values of 82.  The output elasticity of labor, O2  = 0.60,  is chosen based on 
empirical work by Christian0 (1988), Ai and Cassou (1995), and others and is close to 
the value of 0.58 used by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).  The value 6 = 0.17 implies 
a  ratio of  nonproductive governme~lt  spending to output of  0.17,  consistent  with the 
postwar U.S.  average. 
Most macroeconomic research  employs a linear law of motion for capital accumu- 
lation.  It is well  known,  however,  that this specification  does  not yield  closed-form 
decision rules except in the special case of  100 percent depreciation.  For  this reason, 
we employ  the nonlinear form given  in  (4) and (9).  Even in these nonlinear forms, 
however, 6 controls the depreciation rate of existing capital.13  Using this specification, 
Hercowitz  and Sampson (1991) report a point estimate of  6 = 0.34,  with a  standard 
deviation of 0.26, using annual data on U.S.  private capital from 1954 to 1987.  Given 
the imprecise nature of  the estimate, we  explore a wide range of values for 6.  With 83 
set at its baseline value (described below), we find that 6 = 0.10 provides a reasonable 
fit of the U.S.  time series of Rt  = %  from 1925 to 1992. This is the period for which 
data on public and private capital stocks are available.14 We also investigate values up 
to 6 = 1.0, which  coincides with the value implicitly  used by  Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1994). 
We examine values for O3  in the range 0 5  O3  5 0.20.  For each O3  in this range, 
we  define  O1  = 1 -  O2 -  83 to maintain the necessary  condition for balanced  growth 
in the model.  Two combinations of  O1  and O3  are of  particular interest.  The first is 
.O1  = 0.277 and 83 = 0.123, which, together with 6 = 0.10, yield an optimal transition 
path that is consistent with the U.S.  time series of Rt = 2  over  most of the sample 
131n the nonlinear law of motion, 6 is most properly interpreted as the elasticity of the next period 
capital stock with respect to current investment. 
''The  capital series are in 1987 dollars and were obtained from  Fixed Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth 
in the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce  (1993).  The series for  kg,t includes nonmilitary 
government-owned equipment and structures. The series for kt includes privately owned equipment and 
structures. The "capital input" measure of of the net stock was used for all capital data. 
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than the maximum value observed in postwar U.S.  data.  The second combination we 
examine is O1  = 0.30 a.nd O3  = 0.10, which implies R* = 0.44.  This ratio coincides with 
the observed value at the end of  our sample in 1992. This case is important because it 
shows that current levels of public capital in the U.S.  economy can be consistent  with 
optimal fiscal policy, even when 133  is as large as 0.10.'~ 
The remaining parameters, Ao, Al, and B, affect the scaling of the model and were 
calibrated using  O1  = 0.271,  O3  = 0.123, and 6  = 0.10.  The value of B = 3.76 implies 
that household labor supply 11 is approximately equal to 0.3 along the balanced-growth 
path.  Given a time endowment normalized to one, this meails that households spend 
approximately  one-third  of  their discretionary time in  market  work.  The constants 
A.  = 4.36 and A1  = 1.16 imply tha.t the ratio of private investment to output is 0.15 
and  the steady-state growth rate of  labor productivity  is 2.77%.  This growth rate 
coincides with the U.S.  average from 1947 to 1969. Our decision to calibrate the growth 
rate to this 23-year subsample of U.S.  data is motivated by our interest in examining 
the degree to which nonoptiinal fiscal policies can account for a productivity slowdown 
of the magnitude observed in the U.S. economy during the early 1970s. 
5. Policy Evaluation 
In this section, we examine how well our model can account for the evolution of the 
stock of  public capital relative to private capital in the U.S.  economy over the last 70 
years.  Figure 1  shows the U.S. time series of  Rt =  over the period 1925 to 1992. The 
series, which is plotted as a dashed line in the figure, grew at a rapid pace throughout 
the 1930s before experiencing a temporary acceleration during World War 11.  After the 
I5If consumer durables are included in kt,  then the ratio Rt  = %  in 1992 is 0.37. In this case, 81 = 
0.31 and  83=0.09 imply R* =  0.37 in  the calibration. 
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that peaked in the mid-1960s. Over the last 30 years, the ratio has displayed a generally 
declining trend. 
For  comparison, figure  1 also  plots  the optimal transition  paths implied  by  our 
model for  three different parameter  settings.  In  general, the model predicts  a rapid 
initial growth in the ratio of  public to private capital, followed by  a leveling off  as the 
economy converges to the balanced growth ratio R*.  Although the U.S.  data do not 
display this  monotonicity,  the model's  optimal transition  path  with  83 = 0.123 and 
S = .10 is generally consistent with the data up until about the mid-1960s, particularly 
if  one views the war years as being influenced by  a temporary shock.  When 83 = 0.10 
and S = .lo, the optimal transition path lies below the U.S. data for most of the sample 
period. 
Figure 1 also shows  the optimal  transition  path when  83 = 0.123  and  S = 1.0. 
Looking to the far right of the figure, we see that S  has a quantitatively small impact on 
the balanced growth ratio R*.'~  Although S  ha.s little effect on R*,  it strongly influences 
the length of  time needed for the transition.  As  one would expect, higher  levels of  6 
lead to more rapid transitions.  When  S = 1.0, the transition occurs in a single jump 
after the initid period.  This illustrates a limitation of  the  Glomm  and  Ravikumar 
(1994) model for analyzing transitional dynamics.  In  the policy analysis that follows, 
we restrict our attention to the case of  6 = 0.10, since this yields a reasonable transition 
path in comparison to U.S.  data. 
5.1.  Optimal Policy and the Recent Decline in Public Capital 
In  recent years,  many  policymakers  and researchers have voiced concern that the 
decline in the ratio of  public to private capital over the last 30 years is evidence that 
161t can be shown that  > 0. 
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that this  conclusion  does not  necessarily  follow.  In  particular,  a  declining ratio of 
public to private capital can be consistent with optimal fiscal policy, even when public 
capital contributes in a significant way to private output. When 93 = 0.10, the optimal 
transition path in figure 1  lies below  the U.S.  time series of Rt = % over the postwar 
period.  Thus, a decline in the U.S. ratio over this period might be interpreted as bringing 
the economy closer to the optimal balanced growth ratio R*. 
To explore the robustness of  this result, consider figure 2, which  shows the effect 
of  varying 93  on R*.  AS public ca.pita.1 becomes  more productive  (93 increases), the 
optimal ratio R*  along the balanced-growth path increases rapidly.  Figure 2 shows that 
when 0 < 93  5 .lo, then R*  5 ' 0.44.  Note that 0.44 is the ra.tio observed at the end 
of  the sample in 1992. Thus, when 0 < 93 < .lo, the model implies that an increase in 
the ratio of  public to private capital from current levels is not called for.  However, if 
93 > 0.10, then figure 2 shows that R*  > 0.44.  In this case, the model implies that the 
ratio of  public to private capital should be increased. 
It is important to note that our analysis does not resolve the debate over whether the 
U.S.  economy is underinvested  in public capital because the optimal ratio R* depends 
crucially  on the size of  g3, which  is the subject of  much uncertainty.  However,  our 
model identifies some middle ground tlzat neither side of  the public-capital debate has 
formally recognized.  Proponents of expanding public investment tend to  make their case 
using empirical evidence that shows O3  > 0. This result, together with the observation 
that the ratio of public to private capital has been  declining over  time, is often cited 
as  evidence of  nonoptimal fiscal policy.  In  contrast, opponents of  expanding public 
investment tend to make their case by testing Ho  :  83 = 0.  Our analysis slzows that this 
condition is much stronger than is needed to establish that the data do not call for an 
17see, for example, Economic Report  of the President, 1994, p.43. 
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decline in the U.S. ratio of public to private capital over the last 30 years is no cause for 
concern.  This argument is made even stronger by the fact that empirical estimates of 
83 tend to be very imprecise.  For example, Finn (1993) estimates the output elasticity 
of  public highway capital to be  0.16.  However, the 95 percent coilfidence  interval on 
this estimate ranges from a low of  0.001 to a high of  0.32.  Thus, even for relatively 
large point estimates of  83, the data do not necessarily imply that the "true"  value of 
83 would call for an increase in public investment. 
5.2.  Public Capital and the Productivity Slowdown 
The debate on the productive effects of public capital is often linked to discussions 
regarding  the slowdown  in the growth rate of  U.S. labor productivity  that began in 
the early  1970s.  Some researchers argue that underinvestment in public capital is at 
least partially responsible for the slo~down.'~  In this section, we  take up this issue by 
examining how some hypothetical nonoptimal fiscal policies can affect the growth rate 
of labor productivity within the context of  our model. 
For  our first experiment, we  investigate the consequences of  a nonoptimal  public 
investment policy.  In the previous section, we pointed out that the observed decline in 
the U.S. ratio of  public to private capital can be reconciled  with optimal fiscal policy 
when d3  5 0.10.  However, if the optimal transition  path from  1925 to 1992 is more 
appropriately described by the case with 83 = 0.123 in figure 1, then the recent decline 
in the U.S. ratio would not be optimal. For this experiment, we  adopt the latter view 
and set 83 = 0.123  (and 81  = .277), which implies  R* = .GO.  Next, as an input to 
the model, we  construct an exogenous series for public investment, iglt,  such that the 
resulting time path for Rt = %  coincides with the path observed in the U.S. economy 
"see,  for example, Aschauer (1993) and Munnell  (1990). 
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3a, while the solid line shows the optimal transitioil path computed earlier in figure 1. 
Since the constructed Rt lies below  the optillla1 tra.nsition pa.th leading to R*  = 0.60, 
and tends to move further awa.y over time, we interpret this experiment as capturing 
the type of nonoptimal public investment policy that is often cited as a possible cause 
of the U.S. productivity slowdown. 
For this experiment, the tax rate is held  constant at the optimal level implied by 
(ll),  and nonproductive government expenditures, gt,  are determined as a residual such 
that the government's  budget  constraint  (8) is  satisfied each period.lg  In  this way, 
we isolate the effect  of  a declining public capital ratio on productivity, holding other 
important policy  variables,  such as tax rates, constant.  Finally,  we  assume that the 
private sector reacts optima.lly to government policy, according to the decision rules (5), 
(61, and (7). 
Figure 3b displays the results of this experiment. The crossed line shows the growth 
trend of labor productivity in the model, given the nonoptimal public investment policy. 
The solid line shows labor productivity when public investment policy is optimal, that 
is, when Rt follows the optimal transition  path leading to R*.  The dashed line shows 
U.S.  labor productivity from 1947 to 1992.  111  comparison to the optimad policy case, 
the nonoptimal policy produces a mild productivity slowdown beginning around 1970. 
Notice, however, that this slowdowil is much less pronounced than the one observed for 
the U.S. economy.  This experiment shows that a nonoptimal public investment policy 
of the type that might be interpreted as reflecting U.S. experience over the last 30 years 
can account for only a small portion of  the productivity slowdown.  This suggests that 
other forces may have  contributed to the slowdown.  One alternative, which  can be 
IgThe  optimal tax rate r* is computed from (11) using  O3 = 0.123,  6 = 0.10, and 4 = 0.17.  Nonpro- 
ductive expenditures are then given  by  gt  = r'yt -  Since gt  is determined as a residual for this 
experiment, the ratio  is no longer constant. 
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policy, namely, increasiilg tax rates. 
For the secoitd experiment, we introduce an exogenous series of  tax rates, rt, that 
coincides with an average tax rate series for the U.S.  Because this series is 
not constant, but displays an increasing trend over time, we interpret it as nonoptimal. 
To isolate the effect of  this nonoptimal tax policy,  we  construct an exogenous  series 
for public investment, igtt,  such that the resulting series for Rt = %  generated by the 
model follows the optimal transition path leading to R* = 0.60.  As before, the private 
sector reacts optimally and the level of  nonproductive expenditures gt is determined as 
a residual such that the government budget constraint is satisfied each period. 
The results of  the second experiment are displayed in figures 4a and 4b.  Figure 4b 
shows that a policy of nonoptimal tax rates call also generate a productivity slowdown. 
The slowdown is much  more severe than in  the first  experiment,  however.  The key 
difference between  the two exercises is  that in the first  experiment,  the government 
misallocates resources between ig,t and gt, while tax revenue as a fraction of total output 
remains constant. In the second experiment, the sha.re of total resources claimed by the 
government increases over time. 
Figure 4b shows that labor productivity in the model displays an abrupt change in 
trend around 1970 that is strikingly similar to the trend shift in U.S. labor productivity 
that occurred at about the same time.  The cause of  this trend shift in the model can 
be traced to the period of  sharply increasing average tax rates in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (see figure 4a). This experiment shows that the existence of a productivity 
slowdown need not imply that public investment policy is nonoptimal. 
20~e  computed the average tax rate series for the U.S. economy by dividing total federal, state, and 
local government receipts for each year (Citibase series GGFR+GGSR+GGFSIN+GGSSIN)  by GDP. 
This approach yields an average tax rate that is roughly consistent with the model's use of a production 
tax to finance  all  government expenditures.  The resulting  tax rate series displays  an  upward  trend 
which is very similar to that observed for the average marginal tax rate on labor income estimated  by 
Barro and  Sahasakul (1986). 
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the model.  The results of  this exercise are summarized in figures 5a and 5b.  As one 
might expect, the productivity slowdown in the model now becomes even more severe. 
This occurs because an increasing fraction of total resources are now being devoted to 
nonproductive public expenditures gt.  Interestingly, the simulated productivity trend 
from the model  provides a very  close match to the U.S.  productivity trend.  Table 1 
provides a quantitative comparison of the productivity effects in each of the three policy 
experiments. 
To summarize, our experiments show that a ilonoptiinal public investment policy 
does not, by itself, provide a coilvinciilg explailation for the U.S. productivity slowdown. 
However, it may have been a  contributiilg factor, together with the trend toward in- 
creasing tax rates.  Finally, we note that ma.ny other explana.tioi~s  have been put forth 
to help explain  the U.S.  productivity slowdown.  Some of  the a1terna.tive hypotheses 
include:  (1) a  return to "normal"  productivity growth from the unsustainably  high 
growth rates experienced after the Great Depression and World War 11; (2) changes in 
demographic factors that have tended to  reduce the quality of the labor force; (3) a fall- 
off in the rate of  research and development spending; (4) increased costs of  complying 
with governmeilt  regulations  (such as mandated pollution  control expenditures);  and 
(5) increases in energy costs due to oil price 
6. Conclusion 
This paper showed that optimal transitional dynamics in a simple endogenous growth 
model can account for much of  the behavior of  the stock of  public capital in the U.S. 
economy  over  the last  70 years.  Moreover,  we showed  that the observed  decline in 
"See  Munnell  (1990), Tatom (1991), Aschauer  (1993), and  the references  cited therein for  a more 
detailed discussion of these alternative hypotheses. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9509.pdfthe U.S.  ratio of  public to private capital since the mid-1960s might  be  interpreted 
as a movement toward  the optimal balanced growth ratio, even for output elasticities 
as high as 0.10.  Finally, we found that a nonoptimal public investment policy of  the 
type consistent with U.S.  data does not have much impact on the growth rate of labor 
productivity in our model, suggesting that other explanations for the U.S. productivity 
slowdown should be considered. 
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Suboptimal Public Investment 
Experiment #2: 
Suboptimal Tax Policy 
Experiment #3: 
Joint Suboptimal Policy 
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Figure 3b:  EFFECT  ON  LABOR  PRODUCTIVITY 
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
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Firm Optimization 
The firm's optimization problem is straightforward.  They choose lt and kt to maximize 
This implies 
and 
nt  =  Yt  - 02% - Q1yt  =  (1 -  01 -  Q2)yt. 
Household Optimization 
Write the problem as choosillg {ct,  It, it,  kt+l :  t 2 0) to maximize 
subject to 
ct  + it  =  (1 -  rt)(wtlt  + ~tkt  + nt), 
Using the results from the firm's optiinization problem and the production function, the 
Lagrangian for this problem can be written as 
L(.) = 5~'  {log (ct - ~htl:)  +  ~t  (1 -  rt)(wtlt + rtk + nt) - ct  -  [ 
eY]). 
t+l  t 
t=O 
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w.1  =  (1 -  rt)(wtlt  + rtkt + nt) - ct  - it  =  0. 
dX  t 
(17) 
Substituting (14)  into (15)  and using rt  = 9  and wt  =  yields 
Using (1)  and (2) and solving (18)  for lt yields 
To find the other decisioll rules we  use the method of  undetermined coefficients.  We 
guess the functional forms 
where a0 and bo are collstailts to be determined.  Substituting these into (16)  and solving 
for a0 gives 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9509.pdfWe  also need  to verify  that our guess  was  correct  by  verifying  that bo is, in  fact, a 
constant. To do this, we  use (14) and (20) to obtain 
Substituting this expression into (17) and using (18), we  can solve for bo: 
Substituting the expression for bo into (21) and combining with (18) gives 
We  can interpret a0 as the marginal propensity to save out of after-tax income. 
Government Optimization 
The government views gt as exogenous and does not include it as part of its optimization 
decision.  The government problem is to choose {T~,  iglt,  kg,t+t,  ct,lt,it,  kt+l :  t > 0)  to 
maximize 
subject to 
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We begin by writing (6) in two forms: 
Substitute (22) into (7) to eliminate rt,  yielding 
Next, substitute this expressioil for lt, together with (4),  into (1) to obtain 
where 
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government budget constraint: 
where gt is viewed as exogenous by the policymaker. An expression for the argument of 
the household utility function can be obtained using (5), (20), (22), and (4). The result 
is 
We now  can write the Lagrangian for the government problem as 
The first-order conditions are 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9509.pdfTo find the decision rules, we  again use the method of  undetermined  coefficients.  We 
guess the functional forms 
where a1  and  bl  are constants to be  determined.  Substituting these expressions into 
(27)  and solving for a1  gives 
a1  =  P 603 
1  -P(1-6). 
To find the optimal decision rule for rt ,  we substitute the expression for a1  into (8) and 
make use of  gt  = 4yt to obtain 
rt  =  a1  + 4. 
We verify that (29)  and (30)  are correct by sllowing that bl is in fact a constant.  To do 
this, we  substitute the optimal tax rate into (6) to obtain 
Substituting this expression, together with (29)  and (30),  into (26)  and solving for b1 
yields 
!h  + Peo6 - (1 -  a1 -  4)  [I-  P(1- 611 
b1  =  7 
1 -  P(1 -  6) 
Since this is constant, our guess is confirmed. 
Derivation of the  Equilibrium Laws of Motion for Private  and Public Capital 
The laws of  motion  (12) and  (13) are relatively  straightforward  to derive.  The 
only tricky part is to first obtain an alternate expression  for the production function. 
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Substituting (G),  (ll),  and (31) into (4) and rearranging gives 
Similarly, substituting (29) and (31) into (9) and rearranging gives 
Making use of  (12) and R* yields  the following expression for the per capita growth 
rate: 
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